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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
UINTAH FREIGHTWAYS, a
corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH and HAL S. BENNETT,
DONALD HACKING and JESSE R. S.
BUDGE, Commissioners of the Public
Service Commission of Utah, and
PACIFIC INTERMOUNTAIN
EXPRESS CO. and CLARK TANK
LINES COMPANY,

Case
No. 9886

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an investigation by the Public Service Commission of Utah to determine why the rate published
by Uintah Freightways for the transportation of crude
oil, in bulk, between specific points within the Uintah
Basin, Utah, should not be permanently suspended.
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DISPOSITION BY PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION OF UTAH
On March 5, 1963, the Public Service Commission
issued its order permanently suspending item No. 324-2
of Second Revised Page 34-A, of Tariff 5-G, PSCU
No. 5, filed October 25, 1962 by Uintah Freightways and
directing Uintah Freightways to cease transportation
of petroleum or petroleum products, in bulk, in tank
vehicles, under or pursuant to said tariff.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff and appellant seeks reversal of the order of
the Public Service Commission dated March 5, 1963.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's statement of facts is filled with argument
and conclusions .
On October 25, 1962, the Intermountain Tariff
Bureau, Inc. issued a Second Revised Page 34-A to become effective on November 30, 1962 in Tariff No. 5-G,
PSCU No.5. The effect of said publication was to designate a new item (324-2) naming a rate of 8¢ per barrel,
per hour, for hauling crude oil, in bulk, between specific
points in the Uintah Basin area. The publication was
made for, and on behalf of, Uintah Freightways, appellant herein. Respondents filed written objections asking
that the tariff be suspended. The Commission refused
respondents' request for temporary suspension and set the
matter for hearing, which was held in Salt L(;lke City on
December 18, 1962.
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Pursuant to such hearing, the Commission, on March
5, 1963, issued its report and order directing appellant
to cease transportation of petroleum or petroleum products, in bulk, in tank vehicles, and suspended and cancelled the above-mentioned tariff. The authority held by
appellant under which it claims the right to transport
petroleum and petroleum products, in bulk, is contained
in Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 1288
issued to it on September 22, 1958. That certificate
authorizes it to "operate as a common carrier of property
handling both freight and express in intrastate commerce, . . . " between the points involved.
It is this language upon which appellant bases its
claimed right to transport petroleum and petroleum products, in bulk.
The certificate under question is an outgrowth of a
certificate originally issued to Sterling Transportation
Company in 1926, Certificate No. 247. (R. 89) The
language of the Commission's initial order dated October
2, 1926, in Case No. 885, was as follows:
"ORDERED FURTHER, That the Sterling
Transportation Company be, and it is hereby,
authorized to operate an automobile freight line
(under Certificate of Convenience and Necessity
No. 274) between Vernal and Salt Lake City,
Utah, via Duchesne, Utah, serving all points within but not without the Uintah Basin; that is to say,
that it shall not receive freight at Heber City,
Utah, destined to Salt Lake City or intermediate
points beyond Heber City, Utah, nor at Salt Lake
City when destined to Heber City or to intermediate points between Salt Lake City and Heber
City, Utah." (R. 89)
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It should be noted that this original certificate contained no commodity description whatever and merely
authorized Sterling Transportation Company to operate
an automobile freight line. Tariffs were filed pursuant
to the certificate on August 11, 1926, and supplemental
tariffs were filed on October 22 and October 23, 1926.
Neither of these tariffs contained any published rate on
bulk petroleum products.
On August 26, 1938, in Case No. 2131, the Commission amended and clarified the above certificate No. 274
held by Sterling Transportation Company in the following language:
"IT IS ORDERED, That Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 274, granted to the
Sterling Transportation Company, a corporation,
by the Public Utilities Commission of the State
of Utah, on October 2, 1926, be, and the same
is hereby amended and clarified so as to authorize
said Sterling Transportation Company, a corporation, to operate as a common motor carrier of
property, handling both freight and express, be
tween Salt Lake City and all points within the
Uintah Basin and east of Heber City, Utah, via
either of the two following routes:
" (R. 91)
(Emphasis Added)
4

On February 17, 1947, the Commission issued an
order changing the corporate name of Sterling Transportation Company to Uintah Freight Lines and continuing in effect Certificates of Convenience and Necessity Nos. 274, as amended, and 503, as originally granted,
under the name of Uintah Freight Lines. (R. 95)
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5
On August 28, 1956, the Commission cancelled Certificates of Convenience and Necessity Nos. 274 and 503
held by Uintah Freight Lines and issued a new Certificate
of Convenience and Necessity No. 1168 to Ringsby Truck
Lines, Inc. pursuant to a joint application of Uintah
Freight Lines and Ringsby Truck Lines whereby the
latter was to assume the operating rights held by the
former. The language of the new certificate issued to
Ringsby was essentially the same as that held by Uintah
Freight Lines and is in substantially the same language
as that presently held by appellant. The pertinent portion
of the certificate, that is the commodity description, was,
and is, identical with that issued in 1938 to Sterling
Transportation Company in certificate No. 274, as
amended. That language was, and is, "to operate as a
common carrier of property, handling both freight and
express." (R. 96-99) (Emphasis Added)
On August 6, 1957, the Commission issued its report
and order in Case No. 4325 - Sub 1 pursuant to the
application of Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. granting additional authority to Ringsby "authorizing it to operate
as a common carrier by motor vehicle for the trans portation of commodities generally, excluding household goods,
explosives, petroleum and petroleum products in bulk,
and commodities which by reason of their size, shape,
weight, origin or destination require special handling or
special equipment, over irregular routes, on call, between
all points in Utah which applicant is now authorized to
serve under Certificate of Convenience and Necessity
No. 1168 on the one hand, and all points in Daggett
County, Utah, on the other hand," (R. 104) (Emphasis
Added)
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In its Findings of Fact in this proceeding, the Commission stated:
"In addition to the services offered by protestants
Ashworth Transfer Inc. and Salt Lake Transfer
Company who are specialized heavy haulers holding statewide authority in Utah, other specialized
haulers such as household goods carriers and bulk
petroleum carriers are authorized to serve the
area intrastate." (R. 103) (Emphasis Added)
This authority issued to Ringsby Truck Lines was
subsequently transferred to appellant and is contained
in part C of its present certificate.
On September 22, 1958, the Commission, in Case
No. 4656, issued Certificate of Convenience and Necessity
No. 1288 to appellant, Uintah Freightways, pursuant to
a joint petition by Ringsby and appellant. The authority
thus issued to appellant is that previously held by Ringsby
and is the authority which it contends authorizes it to
transport petroleum and petroleum products, in bulk.
The authority reads now as it did in 1938: "to operate
as a common carrier of property handling both freight
and express in intrastate commerce . . . " (R. 110)
(Emphasis Added)
We think it important to briefly set out the history
of the authorities of respondents Clark Tank Lines Company, hereinafter referred to as "Clark" and Pacific
Intermountain Express Co., hereinafter referred to as
"P.I.E.".
On July 31, 1956, P.I.E. acquired the authority previously held by Collett Tank Lines which authorizes it

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
to transport petroleum and petroleum products, in bulk,
in tank trucks and trailers over irregular routes between
all points and places in the state of Utah. (R. 114) This
statewide authority was obtained by Collett Tank Lines
in 1953. (R. 121) Collett Tank Lines first began transporting petroleum and petroleum products, in bulk, in
the state of Utah in 1941. (R. 132)
Clark obtained its authority to transport petroleum
and petroleum products, in bulk, between all points and
places in the state of Utah in 1953 at the same time
Collett Tank Lines obtained identical authority. (R. 139)
Clark began transporting petroleum and petroleum products, in bulk, in the state of Utah by acquiring the
authority previously held by Paul J. Cox which was
issued in August, 1943 . (R. 145)
Neither appellant or any of its predecessors appeared
in opposition to any of the applications, proceedings or
hearings by which respondents Clark and P.I.E., or their
predecessors, acquired their specialized authority for
handling bulk petroleum and petroleum products.
(R. 66)
On pages 5 and 6 of its brief, appellant states that
Uintah Freight Lines and its predecessor, Sterling Transportation Company, handled transportation of liquid
petroleum products, in bulk, and cites as authority therefor, Exhibit 2. Such is not the case. Exhibit 2 clearly
shows that the only bulk transportation performed was
in the years 1938 and 1939, in an unidentified amount,
by Sterling Transportation Company. This fact was
properly noted by the Commission in its order. (R. 196-
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197) Sterling Transportation hauled no bulk petroleum
at any other time. Uintah Freight Lines never hauled any
bulk petroleum. Ringsby has never hauled any bulk
petroleum, nor has appellant hauled any bulk petroleum
at any time.
Appellant has never owned any equipment suitable
for the transportation of bulk petroleum products (R. 24)
nor has it ever had a tariff on file which would allow
such transportation. (R. 26)

ARGUMENT
Point I.
APPELLANT'S CERTIFICATE IS SUBJECT TO
INTERPRETATION BY THE COMMISSION
The Commission properly stated the issue in its Findings of Fact:
"The sole question for determination is the
interpretation to be given to said certificate No.
1288." (R. 196)
We do not question the authorities and the prior
opinions of this Court to the general effect that if a
certificate is clear and unambiguous and if there is no
uncertainty therein, there is no basis for interpretation.
Appellant quotes from the case of Salt Lake Transfer
Company vs. Barton Truck Lines, Inc. (1959), 8 Utah
2d 401, 335 P. 2d 829. However, it does not continue
with the pertinent portions of the quotation. This Court
held in that case:
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"We do not gainsay the correctness of the rule
set forth in Peterson v. Public Service Commission,
relied upon by Plaintiffs; that the extent of the
carrier's authority is to be found from the terms
of the certificate. We there said that it is not
permissible, 'to go back of the language and contrdict its plain terms * * *.' However, that is only
one side of the coin. The other is that when the
language is reasonably susceptible of different interpretations it can only be properly understood
in the light of existing circumstances and the purpose behind it. We are unable to see any particular
merit in plaintiffs' contention, but if there be any,
this case is a good example of the necessity of
looking to the background and character of the
grant to determine the rights existing thereunder.

***

"The order made finds further support in the
doctrine of administrative interpretation: that
where the grant is open to doubt or uncertainty,
some weight is to be given to the interpretation
and application the commission has made. Further
implementing this conclusion is the fact that the
plaintiffs themselves have heretofore conformed
their operations with the Commission's interpretation, ... "
That each case must be determined upon its own
merits is clearly set forth in the language of this Court
in Milne Truck Lines, Inc. vs. Public Service Commission
of Utah ( 1962), 13 Utah 2d 72, 368 P. 2d 590. That
case is absolutely controlling in this situation. In that
case this Court sustained an order of the Public Service
Commission holding that the authority of Milne authorizing it to transport "commodities generally" did not

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
include the authority to transport petroleum and petroleum products in bulk. In that case as in this case, there
had been no holding out by the carrier, no tariff published, and no equipment available for such transportatation. The Court stated:
"In the instant case there is evidence that
neither the Public Service Commission nor the
carriers operating in this area have ever assumed
that the term 'commodities generally' included
petroleum and petroleum products in bulk in tank
vehicles.''
Appellant contends that it is authorized to transport
"property handling both freight and express" and urges
that the term property is broader than the term general
commodities or commodities generally as construed in
the Milne case. Under appellant's theory if "property''
is a part of the commodity description and is all inclusive
and broader than the term "general commodities," there
would be no need to add the phrase "handling both
freight and express."
Actually the word "property" is not a part of the
commodity description in appellant's certificate and is
not used to describe the scope of the authority granted
but is merely the term used by the Commission to denote
whether or not the authority relates to the transportation
of "property" or "passengers." This is evident by the form
used by the Commission for applications for Certificates
of Public Convenience and Necessity (Form No. A-27).
In the caption of that form, there is a space for insertion
of either the term "passengers" or "property", and there
are subsequent provisions for the commodity description.
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In other words, the appellant's certificate authorizes the
transportation of "property" as opposed to "passengers",
and the descriptive portion of the commodity description
is "freight and express." The term "express" has been
consistently defined by the Utah Commission and by the
Interstate Commerce Commission as involving an expedited type of service not provided by general commodity carriers, usually at an increased rate and normally
relating to small shipments of limited weight.
In the recent case of Railway Express Agency, Incorporated, Extension - Nashua, MC 66562 (Sub No.
1515), 15 F.C.C. 35, 508, 91 M.C.C. 311, the Interstate
Commerce Commission stated:
"Later, in Trasportation Activities of Arrowhead Freight Lines ( 11 Federal Carriers Cases
33,239), 63 M.C.C. 5 73, and in Mistletoe Exp.
Service Extension - Texas (9 Federal Carriers
Cases 32,793), 61 M.C.C. 737, 747, it was em·~
phasized that the term 'general commodities moving in express service' includes a bona fide holding
out, together with the ability to transport any
commodity which may be safely transported in
ordinary van-type equipment, including those requiring a maximum degree of care or security or
both; but that it does not include the transportation of liquid commodities in tank vehicles, ... "
(Emphasis Added)
See also Railway Express Agency, Incorporated, Extension, MC 66562 (Sub No. 217), 3 F.C.C. 30,064, 31
M.C.C. 363, Railway Express Agency, Incorporated, Extension, MC 66562 (Sub No. 194), 3 F.C.C. 30,359,
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31 M.C .. C. 603 and Arrowhead Freight Lines, Ltd., No.
MC C-1052, 9 F.C.C. 32, 615, 61 M.C.C. 131.
Thus if appellant is to prevail, it must be on the
proposition that the single term "freight" authorizes the
transportation of bulk petroleum products notwithstanding a previous history that none of the carriers in the
state of Utah, including appellant, nor the Commission
has ever given it such a construction.
We think it must be conceded that the term "freight"
means something less than the term "general commodities" as that term was construed in the Milne case. The
Utah Legislature has so treated it. In the definition of
the term "automobile corporation" in Section 54-2-1
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the statute refers to persons,
corporations, and others engaged in the business of transporting "freight, merchandise, or other property." Paragraph ( 14) of the same section defines the term "common
carrier" by distinguishing between "freight, refrigerator,
oil, stock, and fruit car corporations engaged in the transportation of property." Furthermore, if the term "freight"
was all inclusive, as urged by appellant, there would be
no necessity for the additional authority to handle "express." The Legislature has again clearly indicated that
it considers the terms "freight and express" to be less
than all inclusive. In Section 59-15-4 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, creating a sales tax on transportation, the
Legislature levied a tax "for all transportation ... provided, that said tax shall not apply to intrastate movements of freight and express." (Emphasis Added) Thus
it is not subject to question that appellant's position in
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this case is much weaker than was Milne's position in
the case above referred to.
In the Milne case, this Court also stated:
"The distinction made in these reports between
'general freight' and 'liquid petroleum products'
would seem to indicate that the terms 'general
commodities' and 'general freight' are not understood to include petroleum products in bulk."
(Emphasis Added)
Appellant states in its brief in several instances that
it has protested all applications for authority to transport
petroleum products, in bulk, since it was certificated in
1958 and adds as an aside that no such applications have
been filed. To claim any benefit from such a statement
is, in our opinion, nonsensical. The fact of the matter is
that the record clearly shows that neither appellant nor
any of its predecessors appeared in protest to any of the
applications or hearings of any of the carriers possessing
the specialized authority to transport petroleum and
petroleum products, in bulk. ( R. 66) Appellant wants
to take credit for the fact that no bulk petroleum applications have been filed since its certification in 1958
and wants to ignore the failure of its predecessors to
appear in protest to the applications of respondents and
their predecessors, and paradoxically it wants to take
credit for the fact that one of its predecessors (Sterling
Transportation Company) did haul some unknown
quantity of bulk petroleum in 1938 and 1939. We submit
that appellant can gain no comfort from such inconsistent
positions.
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This Court in the Milne case, supra, indicated that
the failure to protest such applications by a general freight
or general commodity carrier was of considerable importance. The Court stated:
"When a carrier which has not previously
transported petroleum products in bulk applies to
the Commission for authority to do so, almost invariably, the carriers already possessing such
authority submit a formal protest to the Commission. Even though there is no evidence that Milne
or any other general commodity carrier has ever
protested the granting of such authority, Milne
contends that it has always had authority to transport petroleum products in tank vehicles.
"There is no indication in the record that
Milne or any other general commodity carrier has
ever held itself out to the public as a carrier of
petroleum products; nor is there any indication
that they ever assumed they had authority to do
so. On the other hand, as has been pointed out,
there is evidence that both the Commission and
the carriers have made a distinction between
general freight and petroleum products in bulk
transported in tank vehicles." (Emphasis Added)
Appellant, in its Statement of Facts, makes the statement that it has actively solicited any and all traffic available, including bulk petroleum products, since it received
its authority in 1958, and again repeats this contention
in its Argument on page 10 of its brief. The Commission
found to the contrary. Its finding is fully supported by
the evidence.
It is undisputed that the appellant has never owned
any equipment suitable for bulk petroleum transportation
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and it has never had a tariff on file permitting such
transportation. Section 54-3-6, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, makes it unlawful for a carrier to perform transportation without an appropriate tariff on file.
We respectfully direct the attention of the Court to
the testimony of Witness Smith, the traffic manager of
appellant, and Witness Grua, its president and general
manager. On direct examination, Witness Smith testified
directly and specifically that he personally had solicited
bulk petroleum transportation. (R. 16, 17) However, on
cross-examination, he reluctantly admitted that he had
not. (R. 23)
Mr. Grua testified generally concerning the solicitation of bulk petroleum products which consisted of a
vague reference to a single contact with Standard Oil
Company in 1961 in which he stated that the solicitation
included all of the products manufactured by Standard
Oil Company but that they did not get far enough in
the conversation to discuss the availability of equipment
or the lack of a tariff. (R. 60) The other so-called
solicitation consisted of contacts with his personal friend,
Mr. Sowards, who has an interest in H. S. Sowards &
Sons, a company domiciled in Vernal, Utah, which itself
transports petroleum products as a commission agent for
Continental Oil Co. Continental Oil Co., not H. S.
Sowards & Sons, pays the freight and has the authority
to give the business to a soliciting carrier. Mr. Sowards
admitted on cross-examination that he had no authority
to award this business to appellant or anyone else. (R. 46)
Certainly common sense dictates that if Grua were
serious in soliciting bulk petroleum business from Con-
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tinental Oil, he would have made his contact directly
with that company which pays the freight, selects the
carrier, and has the authority to award the business, and
not with his friend in V emal who was unable to give the
business to him had he wanted to.
We cannot believe that appellant is serious in its
contention that it has ever actually solicited bulk petroleum business and held itself out for such transportation.
We think the record clearly shows that it has not and
that no carrier can hold itself out to perform a transportation service for which it has no equipment available
and no tariff on file. Certainly the evidence clearly supports the Commission's finding that it has not held itself
out for such transportation.
The Commission's interpretation is further borne out
by an examination of the history of bulk petroleum transportation in the state of Utah. At the time Sterling
Transportation Company was issued its authority, there
was no outstanding authority for petroleum products, in
bulk. This specialized authority was issued to respondents
and other carriers in similar situations during the war
emergency in 1941 and 1942. The meticulous care taken
by the Commission in determining what bulk petroleum
authority should be issued is evidenced by Commissioner
Hacking's dissent in 1947 in Case No. 2894 granting
Clark Tank Lines Co. additional authority. He stated:
"I dissent. I do not believe that the record
supports the application for additional operating
authority in the State of Utah for the transportation of petroleum and petroleum products in bulk
in tank-truck and tank-trailer. The record shows
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that during the early days of the recent war railroad tank cars being used in the transportation of
petroleum and petroleum products in bulk were
withdrawn from service in this area suddenly
placing a very heavy burden on tank-truck transporters. It further appears that during the following years until cessation of hostilities, there was an
increased distribution of gasoline occasioned by war
installations which was noticeably reduced after
the war and railroad tank cars are back in service
in this area.
The record further shows that since October
14, 1936, R. A. Gould has served as a contract
carrier of petroleum products in bulk in the State
of Utah, and that since November 19, 1941, Owen
M. Collett has been authorized and has served
the shippers of the State of Utah for the transportation of petroleum and petroleum products.
Under press of war emergency, contract carrier
permits #138 and#290 in the name of R. A.
Gould were cancelled, and a temporary certificate
of convenience and necessity # 634 was issued on
April 29, 1944. On the 15th day of July, 1943,
contract carrier permits #274 and #285 issued
to Owen M. Collett were cancelled, and temporary certificate of convenience and necessity
#616 was issued. Each of the above mentioned
carriers and particularly Owen M. Collett has
greatly increased the amount of equipment operated since the beginning of the war.
It further appears that said existing contract
carriers subsequently operating as common carriers of petroleum products in bulk at the time
of the taking of the testimony in this case, were
financially able, and had sufficient equipment to
handle all of the petroleum and petroleum pro-
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ducts in bulk reasonably anticipated to be shipped
in intrastate commerce in Utah by motor vehicle.
Before any additional permanent operating authority, arising out of the war emergency is granted,
R. A. Gould and Owen M. Collett should be given
a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate whether
or not they can adequately meet the service requirements following post war adjustments and
there should be convincing evidence that these two
carriers are unable or unwilling to meet the reasonable demands that might be made of them. I do
not believe any such showing has been made in
this record.
After careful examination of the evidence, I
find that there is no showing of convenience and
necessity for applicant's service as described in
his application, and therefore, the application
should be denied." (R. 142B, 142C)
It is apparent that neither appellant's predecessors
nor the Commission considered such predecessors or other
general commodity carriers as being in the bulk transportation business. This again points up the importance
of their failure to appear and protest such applications.
If they were, in fact, holding themselves out for such
transportation and claiming authority to perform it, their
failure to make such facts known, must work as an estoppel at this late date.
Appellant argues that inasmuch as there is an exclusion in part C of its authority relating to bulk petroleum
products the omission of such exclusion in the portion
under consideration is of importance. There might be
some substance to this contention if the different portions
of appellant's authority had been issued at the same time.
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However, part C was issued to Ringsby Truck Lines in
1957, and the restriction against the transportation of
bulk petroleum products was voluntarily placed upon the
authority by the Commission even though the certificated
bulk petroleum carriers did not protest the application.
(R. 103) Their failure to so protest is further evidence
that they did not consider general commodity carriers or
general freight carriers as even asserting a right to transport bulk petroleum products.
Appellant cites the case of Coastal Tank Lines, Inc.
et al vs. Charlton Bros. Transportation Company, Inc.
( 1948) 48 M.C.C. 289, to the effect that the Interstate
Commerce Commission has interpreted a certificate
authorizing the transportation of general commodities as
including authority to transport petroleum products in
bulk. The Interstate Commerce Commission has, on
many different occasions, construed the term "general
commodities" in different ways. When this Court was
considering the Milne case, supra, the interpretation
claimed by appellant here was urged upon it, and it was
referred to the Coastal Tank Lines case, supra. The Interstate Commerce Commission's interpretation was rejected by this Court.
Further evidence that neither the parties nor the
Commission have ever considered appellant's authority
to authorize the transportation of bulk petroleum products is found in the order of the Commission, dated
September 22, 1958 in which appellant was issued the
authority now under consideration. In paragraph 9 of
that order, the Commission stated:
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"That Uintah Freightways has filed a schedule of
equipment that it proposes to use in the conduct
of the transportation service described in this application, which equipment appears to be proper
and adequate to perform the proposed transportation service." ( R. 109 )
That schedule of equipment contained none suitable
for the transportation of bulk petroleum products. Had
either appellant or the Commission considered the authority transferred to include bulk petroleum products, such
a statement would not have been made in the absence
of such specialized equipment.
The following quotation from the Milne case, supra,
is eloquent argument of its applicability to the case at
hand:
"This court has repeatedly held that where the
Commission has acted within the scope of its authority, its order will not be disturbed if it has
any substantial foundation in the evidence and is
not unreasonable or arbitrary. (Mulcahy v. Public
Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117 P. 298;
Union Pacific R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 102 Utah 465, 132 P.2d 128.) In determining
whether the Commission's order is supported by
the evidence, this court must consider the factors
underlying such order. When, as in the case at
hand, the Commission's order is based upon the
meaning of a term as it is used in the motor
carrier industry, the court will take into account
the special knowledge that the Public Service
Commission has acquired through its continuo?s
experience in the motor carrier field. (See Landts,
Administrative Process, p. 152, 14 Miss.L.J. 321.)
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Its superior understanding of the carrier industry,
plus the fact that the legislature has delegated to
the Commission the power to limit a carrier's
authority, requires that considerable weight be
given to its finding. (Utah Freightways, Inc. v.
Public Service Commission, 9 Utah 2d 414, 346
P.2d 1079.) It must be conceded that this court,
by merely reading the record, cannot be made
fully aware of the meaning the motor carrier industry has given to the term, 'commodities generally.'
"The reasonableness of the Commission's order
must be determined in light of the statutory setting
in which it operates. The Commission is required
by statute to regulate so as to prevent unnecessary
duplication of services in areas where the existing
transportation service adequately meets the needs
of the public. (54-6-4, U.C.A. 1953.) Where there
are two possible interpretations of the authority
contained in a certificate, the interpretation which
more fully conforms to the statutory purpose
should be adopted. Recognizing that one purpose
of this legislation was to prevent unfair and
destructive service, this court has held that the
Commission's assent was necessary before a carrier
could increase its service, even though the scope
of its service was not expressly limited in the carrier's certificate. (Gilmer v. Public Utilities Commission, 67 Utah 222, 24 7 P. 284.) The same
principle is applicable to the case now before us.
To allow Milne and other general commodity
carriers to transport petroleum and petroleum
products in tank vehicles without first determining
that such service is necessary and in the public
interest, would not only be contrary to our statutory purpose, but would substantially impede the
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regula tory function of the Public Service Commission."
The importance of this case can not be overestimated.
To allow appellant, under the circumstances here prevailing, to invade the field of bulk petroleum transportation
would result in chaos, not regulation. It would destroy
the years of meticulous care given by the Commission in
controlling the regulation of transportation in this as well
as all other specialized fields and is obviously contrary to
the interpretation placed upon the authority by the Commission, the appellant, and all carriers concerned.
Appellant's certificate is certainly subject to interpretation by the Commission, and that interpretation
being fully supported by the evidence should be affirmed
by this Court.

Point II
THE FINDINGS AND ORDER OF THE
COMMISSION ARE FULLY SUPPORTED
BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND ARE
NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS
Point II and Point III raised in appellant's brief
merely assert the conclusion that the order of the Commission and its suspension of the tariff were arbitrary,
capricious, and unconstitutional. Points II and III will
be treated herein jointly.
Appellant claims that the evidence is undisputed that
it has continuously held itself out as ready, willing and
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Lhle to transport petroleum and petroleum products, in
mlk, in tank vehicles. With this statement, we disagree.
rhe Commission is certainly entitled to take into con;ideration the candor, or lack thereof, of the witnesses.
Witness Smith testified on direct that he personally had
;olicited bulk petroleum transportation. (R. 16, 17) How~ver, on cross-examination, he admitted, after some prodiing, that he had not. This is what appellant designates
as "undisputed evidence." The same is true of the testinony of Witness Grua. See the discussion under Point I.
Appellant's position seems to be that the active solicitation of petroleum products, ·in bulk, and a bona fide
holding out as ready, willing and able to perform such
transportation service can be satisfied by the mere state
of mind of the carrier.
The record is replete with testimony and documentary
evidence fully supporting the Commission's findings that
there was no actual holding out, that neither the Commission nor the appellant nor any of the carriers involved
ever considered the authority in question to include bulk
petroleum products. There is a complete absence of
credible evidence of any kind that appellant did hold
itself out to perform such transportation. Certainly the
Commission is entitled to consider the fact that the appellant had no equipment for this transportation and
had no tariff on file which would permit it to be performed lawfully. The Commission has acted within the
scope of its authority and there is substantial evidence
to support its findings and order. See Mulcahy vs. Public
Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117 P. 298; Union
Pacific R. Co. vs. Public Service Commission, 102 Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24
465, 132 P.2d 128 and Milne Truck Lines, Inc. vs. Public
Service Commission, supra.
Point III.
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S OFFER OF PROOF CONCERNING
AUTHORITIES OF CERTAIN CARRIERS
Appellant made an offer of proof of the authorities
of certain carriers not parties to this proceeding. The
Commission properly denied such offer.
The authorities of other carriers in and of themselves
would be of no aid whatever to the Commission in interpreting the meaning of appellant's certificate as was
pointed out by this Court in the Milne case, supra:
"It is possible that authority to transport
'commodities generally' has a different meaning
in one part of the country than it does in another.
The scope of such authority might also vary from
carrier to carrier due to different conditions
existing at the time the certificate was issued."
(Emphasis Added)
Respondents herein have spent considerable time outlining the history of the certificates of appellant as well
as those of respondents in order to show the factual background under which the certificate in question was issued,
as an aid in determining the intent of the Commission
at the time of its issuance. Obviously, the naked certificates of other carriers without a historical background
to explain or amplify their meaning would be of no value
in this proceeding.
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Appellant argues that the certificates offered were
~eneral in their terms with explicit exclusions as to
::;ertain commodities and from that concludes that they
would control the interpretation of its certificate.
This argument is not convincing. Authorities may be
issued, for example, to transport "chemicals" excluding
certain items that may or may not normally be in the
chemical field. The exclusion may be for the purpose
of eliminating a protest of a carrier appearing at the
hearing who contends its authority embraces a chemical
and the applicant may agree to an amendment excluding
such commodity without any binding effect whatever
upon the Commission that the specific commodity is
or is not a chemical. Furthermore, the fact that exclusions
appear after a commodity description does not in any
way indicate that the commodity description itself is
all inclusive.
CONCLUSION
The interpretation placed upon appellant's certificate
by the Commission is fully supported by the evidence,
is a reasonable and necessary interpretation in light of
the history of the transportation of petroleum products,
in bulk, in this state and the same should be affirmed
by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
MARK K. BOYLE
345 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for
Defendants and Respondents
Pacific Intermountain Express Co.
and Clark Tank Lines Company

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

